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A B S T R A C T   
Pavlovian conditioning results in individual variation in the vigor and form of acquired beha-
viors. Here, we describe a general-process model of associative learning (HeiDI; How excitation 
and inhibition determine ideo-motion) that provides an analysis for such variation together with 
a range of other important group-level phenomena. The model takes as its starting point the idea 
that pairings of a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US) result in the 
formation of reciprocal associations between their central representations. The asymptotic values 
of these associations and the rate at which these are reached are held to be influenced by the 
perceived salience of the CS (αCS) and US (βUS). Importantly, whether this associative knowledge 
is exhibited in behavior that reflects the properties of the CS (e.g., sign-tracking) or US (e.g., goal- 
tracking) is also influenced by the relative values of αCS and βUS. In this way, HeiDI provides an 
analysis for both quantitative and qualitative individual differences generated by Pavlovian 
conditioning procedures.    
“Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at 
random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select – doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man and 
thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors. I am going beyond my facts, and I admit 
it, but so have the advocates to the contrary, and they have been doing so for many thousands of years.” (p. 82; Watson, 1924).  
Watson’s central thesis might seem less controversial now than it did almost a century ago: An appropriately conducive en-
vironment – where different forms of training can be arranged – affords the development of selected paths in infants taken randomly 
from the normal population. His central thesis did not deny the existence of individual differences that have different origins (e.g., 
talents, penchants etc.), but it did suggest that training might free an individual from them. However, the fact that dramatic in-
dividual differences in acquired behavior can emerge in animals given identical training in a controlled environment is – if not 
antithetical – then certainly problematic from an empiricist perspective (e.g., Iliescu, Hall, Wilkinson, Dwyer, & Honey, 2018;  
Patitucci, Nelson, Dwyer, & Honey, 2016; but see, Byrom & Murphy, 2018). For example, such individual variation is beyond the 
scope of general-process theories of associative learning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980;  
Wagner, 1981) in which the relationship between the strength of an association and performance is held to be monotonic: How could 
a single acquired property (like associative strength; V) be manifest in distinct ways across a set of rats? We have recently presented a 
model, HeiDI, which offers a potential answer to this question (Honey et al., 2020a, 2020b). Before we present that answer, we 
should first describe results that provided an important impetus for the development of HeiDI. 
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1. Individual differences in conditioned behavior 
What happens when a given set of healthy rats is food restricted and then receives identical training trials in a standard con-
ditioning chamber? If the temporary insertion of a lever into the chamber serves as the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the delivery of 
sucrose (for example) serves as the unconditioned stimulus (US), then the CS will come to elicit conditioned responses (CRs): The rats 
develop a tendency to interact with the lever and to approach the well into which sucrose is about to be delivered. The fact that the 
CS can provoke multiple CRs is of interest in its own right: It suggests that the CR is not simply determined by the unconditioned 
responses provoked by the US (e.g., to approach the location where the US will be delivered; cf. Pavlov, 1927). More interesting, 
however, is the fact that the distribution of these two forms of CR differ across rats given this autoshaping procedure: with some being 
more likely to interact with the lever (called sign-tracking; e.g., Hearst & Jenkins, 1974) than to approach the food well (called goal- 
tracking; e.g., Boakes, 1977), and others being more likely to approach the food well than to interact with the lever (e.g., Iliescu et al., 
2018; Patitucci et al., 2016). This variation is relatively continuous in nature and remarkably stable from one day to the next: These 
are qualitative individual differences in acquired behavior (see Fitzpatrick et al., 2013; see also, Matzel et al., 2003). Fig. 1 illustrates 
the results of a representative experiment in which rats received training where the insertion of one lever (for 10 s) was followed by 
the delivery of sucrose, while the insertion of another was not (Experiment 2; Patitucci et al., 2016). The rats have been separated 
into two groups based on their bias to sign-track and goal-track in the final block of training; with the bias scores calculated in the 
following way: (number goal-tracking responses – number of sign-tracking responses) / (number goal-tracking responses + number 
of sign-tracking responses). Using this measure of bias to split the rats into two groups enables the development of sign-tracking and 
goal-tracking behaviors to be illustrated. But as already noted, the individual differences are relatively continuous across the group of 
rats as a whole, as we will have cause to return to at a later point. 
It takes a moment to fully appreciate the theoretical significance of the fact that rats given identical training exhibit what they 
have learnt in qualitatively different ways: There is no coherent mapping between learning and the two measures of performance 
(sign-tracking and goal-tracking). Focusing on lever-oriented behavior suggests that the sign-tracking group learnt more readily than 
the goal-tracking group, while focusing on food-well oriented behavior suggests just the opposite. This is true whether one construes 
learning as the development of associations between the representation of the CS (the lever) and the processes responsible for 
generating responding (e.g., Hull, 1943; Spence, 1937) or between the representations of the CS and the US (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975;  
Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Indeed the problem is yet more ubiquitous: It is a challenge to any model that 
Fig. 1. The emergence of qualitative differences in conditioned behavior across 10 blocks of training. Mean ( ± SEM) levels of lever activity (sign- 
tracking) and food well activity (goal-tracking). Rats were divided into sign-trackers (left panels) and goal-trackers (right panels), with scores 
separated for the lever paired with sucrose and the lever that was not. Adapted from: Patitucci, E., Nelson, N., Dwyer, D.M., & Honey, R.C. (2016). 
The origins of individual differences in how learning is expressed in rats: A general-process perspective. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Learning and Cognition, 42, 313-324. 
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assumes that a single process underlies learning and its translation into performance (e.g., Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000; Stout & Miller, 
2007). In the context of associative theories of learning, the problem reflects a surprising reluctance to specify how the strength of a 
CS-US association (i.e., VCS-US) is translated into conditioned responding: with most models simply assuming that there is a monotonic 
relationship between VCS-US and conditioned behavior. What is required is a general-process model that (i) specifies the mnemonic 
structures that underpin learning and performance, (ii) describes the rules governing how change occurs within those structures, and 
(iii) isolates potential sources of individual differences. HeiDI is such a model. 
2. HeiDI 
The mnemonic structures assumed to underpin learning and performance are depicted in Fig. 2. The left-hand side shows the 
pattern of unconditioned links between the CS, US and a set of response generating units (r1-r6). Some of these units are more 
strongly activated by the CS than the US (r1-r3), and some are more strongly activated by the US than the CS (r4-r6), with the 
darkness of the links denoting their strength. In this way, a general distinction is made between CS-oriented behaviors (r1-r3; e.g., 
orienting, lever approach, rearing) and US-oriented behaviors (r4-r6; e.g., food well approach, chewing, swallowing; see also,  
Holland, 1977, 1984). The right-hand side of Fig. 2 shows the conditioned structure, where standard Pavlovian conditioning trials – 
in which the CS immediately precedes the US – are assumed to result in the formation of reciprocal (CS-US and US-CS) associations 
(cf. Asratian, 1952, 1965; Pavlov, 1932; for a review, see Goremezano & Tait, 1976; but see, Konorski, 1948). In this way, a minimal 
functional cell assembly is formed: When the CS is presented activation propagates to the US, which is propagated back to the CS 
(e.g., Grossberg, 1980; Hebb, 1949). This structure contrasts with other trial-based models of associative learning (e.g., Mackintosh, 
1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) where the focus has been on the formation of CS-US associations, with their 
functional alignment to a process of prediction in spite of the fact that the models are trial based (i.e., the change in associative 
strength is assumed to occur upon presentation of the US). The reciprocal nature of the associations within HeiDI means that there is a 
basis for CS-oriented conditioned responses to change, through the influence of the US-CS association, independently of the influence 
of the CS-US association, which primarily affects US-oriented conditioned responses. The rules governing the formation of these 
associations are captured in Eqs. 1 and 2. Eq. 1 determines the development of the CS-US association, and is a simplification to the 
Rescorla-Wagner error-correcting learning rule, while Eq. 2 is the formally equivalent rule for the development of US-CS associations. 
These equations both reduce the number of free parameters from those in the Rescorla-Wagner model, and generate increased 
explanatory power, especially when coupled with formally equivalent equations for determining the formation of associations be-
tween two CSs (which we will come to shortly). 
=V (c. V )CS-US CS US TOTAL-US (1)  
=V (c. V )US-CS US CS TOTAL-CS (2)  
The perceived salience of the US determines the asymptote for the CS-US association, and at the same time the perceived salience 
of the CS determines the asymptote for the US-CS association. In Eq. 1, the maximum strength of the CS-US association is 1 in units of 
V (denoted c) modulated by the value of the parameter βUS, which aligns to the perceived salience of the US (i.e., c.βUS). The value of 
αCS determines the rate at which the CS-US association changes, and aligns to the perceived salience of the CS. In Eq. 2, the maximum 
strength of the US-CS association is again 1 in units of V (i.e., c), and is modulated by the value of αCS (i.e., c.αCS). In this case, the 
value of βUS determines the rate at which the US-CS association changes. αCS and βUS are confined to the unit interval 0≤ αCS, βUS ≤ 
1, and thus modulate both the rate of learning and the maximum strength of the reciprocal associations. In Eqs. 1 and 2, when the CS 
is absent, αCS and c.αCS are both set to 0 and when the US is absent, βUS and c.βUS are both set to 0. This arrangement allows the 
strength of the CS-US association to change on trials on which the CS is present, but the US is no longer presented, and the US-CS 
association to change on trials on which the US is presented but the CS is absent (cf. Wagner & Rescorla, 1972; Wagner, Logan, 
Fig. 2. A schematic of the associative structures that are assumed to underpin Pavlovian learning and performance. The left-hand depicts the 
unconditioned structure (i.e., before conditioning), with the darkness of the links between the CS and r1-r6 and the US and r1-r6 indicating their 
strength; and the right-hand side depicts the conditioned structure (i.e., after conditioning). The reciprocal CS-US and US-CS associations are 
denoted by the dashed lines. Adapted from: Honey, R.C., Dwyer, D.M., & Iliescu, A.F. (2020). HeiDI: A model for Pavlovian learning and perfor-
mance with reciprocal associations. Psychological Review (in press). 
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Haberlandt, & Price, 1968). 
According to Eq. 1, during simple conditioning, the strength of the CS-US association (i.e., VCS-US) converges asymptotically on 
c.βUS, with the change in associative strength of this association on a given trial (ΔVCS-US) being determined by the error in the pooled 
error term for the US (c.βUS – ΣVTOTAL-US). ΣVTOTAL-US denotes the total net associative strength of the CS with respect to the US, and 
excitatory learning stops when ΣVTOTAL-US = c.βUS, and the learning rate parameter αCS affects the rate at which VCS-US approaches 
c.βUS. Under conditions in which more than one CS (e.g., stimulus A and stimulus B) is paired with a US, the pooled error term means 
that the development of the A-US association will be influenced by the strength of the B-US association. That is, ΣVTOTAL-US is equal to 
the total or combined associative strengths of A and B with respect to the US. 
Eq. 2 is the complementary rule governing the formation of the US-CS association. Here, the change in the strength of this 
association (ΔVUS-CS) on a given trial is also determined by the error within the pooled error term for the CS (c.αCS – ΣVTOTAL-CS); with 
ΣVTOTAL-CS denoting the associative strength of the single US (in typical conditioning procedures) with respect to the CS. Learning 
ceases when ΣVTOTAL-CS = c.αCS, and the learning rate parameter βUS affects the rate at which VUS-CS approaches c.αCS. If we now 
consider what happens on a trial in which a compound of two stimuli (A and B) precedes a US, then the c.αCS values for each CS in a 
compound (i.e., c.αA and c.αB) set independent asymptotes for the US-A and US-B associations; and B will compete with the US for 
association with A, and A will compete with the US for association with B (see Honey et al., 2020a, 2020b). 
The associative structures depicted in Fig. 2, together with the learning (Eqs. 1–3) and performance (Eqs. 4 and 5) rules, are 
readily extended to the case where two CSs (A and B) become linked. In Eqs. 1 and 2, for example, αCS and βUS can be replaced with 
αA and αB, respectively. In fact, group-level differences in such associations enable HeiDI to explain some of the phenomena that were 
beyond the scope of the model proposed by Rescorla and Wagner (1972); see Honey et al. (2020a, 2020b). But, individual differences 
in the perceived saliences of A and B could also constitute a basis for individual differences in learning and performance. These 
differences could be directly observed during pairings of two stimuli that evoke different unconditioned behaviors (e.g., a tone with a 
light; see Honey, Good, & Manser, 1998; Honey, Watt, & Good, 1998; see also, Narbutovich & Podkopayev, 1936; cited in Konorski, 
1948, p. 91), or indirectly observed through a range of sensory preconditioning procedures (e.g., Pavlov, 1931/1932; cited in  
Kimmel, 1977; see also Brogden, 1939; Rescorla & Cunningham, 1978; Ward-Robinson & Hall, 1996). However, as far as we are 
aware, there have been no studies that have examined whether or not such individual differences are evident in the vigor or form of 
conditioned behavior acquired as a consequence of sensory-sensory pairings. 
We have already noted that HeiDI assumes that αCS and βUS are aligned to the perceived salience of the CS and US, respectively. 
When this assumption is combined with the learning rules (i.e., Eqs. 1 and 2) it is clear that individual differences in the perceived 
salience of the CS and US will affect both the asymptotic values of the CS-US and US-CS associations, and the rates at which these 
values are reached. That is, quantitative differences in learning are predicted to the extent that there are differences in the perceived 
salience of the CS and US. However, the individual differences in CS-oriented and US-oriented conditioned behaviors (e.g., sign- 
tracking and goal-tracking) are not only quantitative but also qualitative (see Fig. 1). This fact clearly requires that there is a more 
complex mapping of associative strength than a monotonic one. HeiDI first assumes that upon presentation of the CS, the associative 
strengths returned by Eqs. 1 and 2 are combined (VCOMB) in the way specified in Eq. 3. VCOMB represents the associative resonance 
within the CS-US assembly, and Eq. 3 weights the associative strength of the stimulus that is present (e.g., VCS-US) more than the 
association involving an associatively activated node (e.g., VUS-CS; see Equation 3). In Eq. 3, VCOMB is in units of V, because VCS-US is 
rendered dimensionless by multiplying it by 1/c. This combination rule captures the idea that the two stimuli function as an as-
sembly, but one in which associative activity generated by the presentation of a stimulus (e.g., the CS) is subject to a process of 
dampening. That is, the US-CS association is only activated to the degree that the US itself is activated via the CS-US association. 
= + ×V V 1
c
. V VCOMB CS-US CS-US US-CS (3)  
Critically, HeiDI assumes that when the CS is presented, VCOMB is distributed into two components, which have different influ-
ences on performance: A CS-oriented component (which influences sign-tracking), and a US-oriented component (which influences 
goal-tracking). One way to do this, is according to the relative perceived saliences of the CS and US (i.e., αCS and βUS): If αCS > βUS 
then CS-oriented behavior would dominate US-oriented behavior, and if βUS > αCS then the reverse is the case. However, this 
proposal is inadequate, because while the perceived salience of a CS will be available upon CS presentation, the perceived salience of 
the US will not: The US is not present. We have proposed, therefore, that the distribution of VCOMB is determined by the value of αCS 
relative to VCS-US (which reflects βUS). That is, HeiDI assumes that VCOMB is distributed into the CS-oriented and US-oriented com-
ponents according to the perceived salience of the CS (αCS) relative to the perceived salience of the retrieved US representation (i.e., 
VCS-US); which is indirectly influenced by the perceived salience of the US (i.e., βUS; see Eq. 1). This idea is formally expressed in Eqs. 
4 and 5 that generate two components, RCS and RUS, which are held to affect the levels of CS-oriented and US-oriented responding, 
respectively. According to these equations, when αCS > VCS-US then RCS > RUS, but the reverse is the case when VCS-US > αCS. That is, 
the balance between CS- and US-oriented behavior is related to the individually perceived salience of the CS and US themselves. To 
address the fact that Eq. 1 (and Eq. 2) can return negative Vs, the absolute value of VCS-US is used in Eqs. 4 and 5 to ensure that the 
proportions are < 1. As before, |VCS-US| is transformed into a dimensionless value by multiplying it by 1/c, which means that RCS and 


























= × + ×r1 1
c
. R V 1
c
. R VCS CS-r1 US US-r1 (6)  
Simulations confirm that changing the value of αCS relative to βUS results in changes in RCS relative RUS: Fig. 3 shows that when 
αCS > βUS then RCS > RUS (see panels B and C), and when αCS < βUS then RCS < RUS (see panels A and D). If these differences are 
multiplied by the strengths of the links (see Fig. 2) between the CS and r1-r6 (e.g., VCS-r1) and the US and r1-6 (e.g., VUS-r1), according 
to Eq. 6, then we have the basis for the translation of associative strength into different forms of behavior. We assume that the value 
of r1-r6, which takes units of V, is reflected in the vigor of their corresponding response forms. 
HeiDI provides a simple associative analysis for a broad range of group-level phenomena that have proven to be a challenge over a 
protracted period, and does so without the need to appeal to some tendentious assumptions or additional (e.g., attentional) processes 
Fig. 3. Simulations of the distribution of VCOMB into RCS and RUS across 20 conditioning trials. RCS (black symbols) and RUS (grey symbols) outputs 
were generated when the following values of αCS and βUS were used in Eqs. 1–5. Panels A and B: αCS was either .30 (A) or .70 (B) and βUS was fixed 
at .50. Panels C and D: αCS was fixed at .50 and βUS was either .30 (C) or .70 (D). Adapted from: Honey, R.C., Dwyer, D.M., & Iliescu, A.F. (2020). 
HeiDI: A model for Pavlovian learning and performance with reciprocal associations. Psychological Review (in press). 
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(see Honey et al., 2020a, 2020b). However, for the present purposes, it is most relevant to consider a series of findings that provide 
support for the analysis of individual differences in the form of responding that HeiDI provides; findings that are also beyond extant 
associative models. One finding that is consistent with the idea that βUS affects performance (through its impact on VCS-US) was 
reported by Patitucci et al. (Experiment 2, 2016). In this experiment, blocks of training in which rats received pairings of the 
presentation of a lever with the delivery of a sucrose reinforcer, were interposed with individual sessions where the affective re-
sponses of the rats to sucrose was assessed through an analysis of microstructure of the licking (see Dwyer, 2012). Patitucci et al. 
observed that individual differences in goal-tracking were a positively correlated with the affective value of sucrose, whereas sign- 
tracking had - if anything - a negative relationship with the affective value of sucrose (see also, Morrison, Bamkole, & Nicola, 2015). 
This is precisely what would be expected if the affective value of the US, as measured by the microstructure of licking, reflected βUS. 
Patitucci et al. (Experiment 1, 2016) also observed that if the presentation of one lever was followed by one US (e.g., sucrose) while 
the presentation of a second lever was followed by a different US (e.g., food pellets) then the bias to either sign-tracking or goal- 
tracking on one lever was uncorrelated with the bias observed on the other lever. This observation is consistent with the inter-
pretation that different USs have different βUS values across a group of rats. This interpretation received direct support from the 
observation that when the same US (food or sucrose) is paired with both levers then there was now a strong correlation between the 
biases shown during presentations of the two levers (Iliescu et al., 2018). Finally, HeiDI assumes that the current value of VCS-US 
affects how VCOMB is distributed into RCS and RUS (see Eqs. 4 and 5): when VCS-US is low relative to αCS then RUS < RCS. This 
assumption predicts that a procedure involving experimental extinction, which should result in a reduction in net VCS-US while 
leaving αCS the same, should result in the preferential distribution of VCOMB to the RCS component (see Eq. 4) rather than to the RUS 
component (see Eq. 5); and thus sign-tracking being more resistant to extinction than goal-tracking. This is precisely what Iliescu 
et al. (Experiment 1, 2018) observed in an experiment in which rats first received a discrimination in which one lever was reinforced 
and a second was not, and then these contingencies were reversed (see also, Ahrens, Singer, Fitzpatrick, Morrow, & Robinson, 2016): 
The reduction in goal-tracking to the formerly reinforced lever was more rapid than the reduction in sign-tracking. This observation 
was apparent irrespective of whether the rats had an original bias to goal-track or sign-track (see also, Anselme, Robinson, & Berridge, 
2012). The key results from the study by Iliescu et al. (2018) are depicted in Fig. 4. 
The upper panels of Fig. 4 depict the relationships between lever presses on training blocks 5 and 6 (left panel) and between food- 
well entries on the same blocks (right panel). Each circle represents a given rat. The filled and open circles denote those classified as 
sign-trackers and goal-trackers, respectively, on the basis of their bias score on the final training block. There was a clear correlation 
between lever presses on blocks 5 and 6 and between food-well entries on these blocks. Moreover, the upper panels indicate that the 
rats designated sign-trackers showed higher levels of lever presses than those designated as goal-trackers, and rats designated goal- 
trackers showed higher levers of food-well entries than those designated sign-trackers. The lower panels depict the relationships 
between the two forms of responding on the final block of training and the first block in which the contingencies were changed (i.e., 
reversed). It is clear that while lever pressing remained relatively unchanged by this manipulation, goal-tracking no longer reflected 
the previous contingencies. In fact, over the course of reversal training, goal-tracking came to rapidly match the changed con-
tingencies while sign-tracking changed less rapidly (see Iliescu et al., 2018). 
The evidence presented thus far has implicated the perceived salience of the US in the distribution of US-oriented and CS-oriented 
behavior. HeiDI also supposes that the perceived salience of the CS should have an effect: a CS with higher perceived salience should 
result in more CS-oriented and less US-oriented behavior. We do not have any direct evidence that bears on this prediction. However, 
if one assumed that the perceived salience of the CS is high at the outset of a stimulus and declines across its duration (e.g., due to 
habituation), then this should be evident as a reduction in sign-tracking and an increase in goal-tracking across the duration of a CS. 
That is, a plausible additional assumption predicts that while some indices of conditioning should decline across a CS, others should 
increase (i.e., show inhibition of delay; Pavlov, 1927). It is worth noting that a similar idea was briefly entertained by Mackintosh (p. 
62, 1974; see also, Pavlov, 1927, p. 104; Staddon, 2005; Staddon & Higa, 1999; Wagner, 1981), who argued that a decay process 
might enable the early and later parts of a CS to be discriminated, and thereby provide a basis for inhibition of delay. In any case, 
formal simulations of HeiDI together with an analysis of archival data confirmed the accuracy of the predictions identified above (see  
Figs. 5 and 6; Iliescu, Dwyer, & Honey, 2020). 
The simulations were conducted with the αCS values set from the outset of the CS at either .30 or .70 and βUS fixed at .50 (panels A 
ad B of Fig. 5), or with the αCS value set from the outset of the CS at .50 and βUS set to .30 or .70 (panels C and D of Fig. 5). Across the 
4 epochs of each trial, these αCS values were subject to exponential decay: αCS(1 – 0.10)2. The αCS value in the fourth epoch was used 
to calculate the change in associative strength in Eqs. 1 and 2. RCS and RUS were calculated by entering the decaying value of αCS into 
Eqs. 4 and 5; and αCS was reset to its starting value after a given trial. It is clear that irrespective of whether the values for the critical 
parameters, αCS and βUS, were set to generate higher values of RUS relative to RCS (panels A and D) or higher values of RCS relative to 
RUS (panels B an C), RUS increased across epochs within a trial while RCS decreased. 
Fig. 6 shows how the lever presses and food-well entries change across training blocks (T1-T6) and across four 2.5-s epochs within 
the 10-s trials, with the upper panes depicting a group of rats designated sign-trackers (group ST) and the lower panes depicting a 
group of rats designated goal-trackers (group GT). z-transformed scores were used to put the different responses (lever presses and 
food-well entries) on the same scale. Inspection of Fig. 6 shows that the lever-pressing bias in group ST was most evident at the start 
of trials, whereas food-well entry bias in group GT was most evident at the end of the trials (see also, Derman, Schneider, Juarez, & 
Delamater, 2018; but see, Lee et al., 2018). These patterns of results match those predicted by HeiDI. 
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3. General discussion 
Individual variation in the form of Pavlovian conditioned behavior has been largely neglected by general process models of 
associative learning. Here, we have illustrated how one model, HeiDI, provides a simple analysis for such variations. The analysis 
relies on a novel specification of the associative structures that underpin learning and performance (see Fig. 2), and the rules 
governing how changes occur within those structures (Eqs. 1 and 2). These rules have two free parameters, αCS and βUS, which are 
aligned to the perceived salience of the CS and US, respectively. These parameters are assumed to be fixed for a given rat, but to vary 
across a set of rats. Variation in the two parameters thereby provides the basis for individual differences in the vigor and form of 
conditioned behavior. Returning to Watson (1924), we now have a general process model of Pavlovian conditioning that provides a 
basis for both quantitative and qualitative individual differences in acquired behavior – changes that emerge as a consequence of 
giving the same training to a group of rats. What is more, this model also provides an analysis for group-level phenomena that have 
Fig. 4. The upper panels show the relationship between the mean number of responses per reinforced trial for lever presses (left-hand panel) and for 
food-well entries (right-hand panel) on training blocks 5 (T5) and 6 (T6). The lower panels show the relationship between the final block of training 
(T6) and the first block on which the formerly reinforced lever was no longer reinforced (R1). The black symbols correspond to rats classified as sign- 
trackers (i.e., group ST) and the grey symbols to those classified as goal-trackers (i.e., group GT). Adapted from: Iliescu, A.F., Hall, J., Wilkinson, L., 
Dwyer, D.M., & Honey, R.C. (2018). The nature of phenotypic variation in Pavlovian conditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Learning and Cognition, 44, 358-369. 
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proven resistant to alternative associative models (see Honey et al., 2020a, 2020b). While HeiDI was developed in the context of 
findings from a model system (i.e., sign- and goal-tracking in rats), it has very broad explanatory power, only some of which derives 
from its adaptation of the pooled error term proposed by Rescorla and Wagner (1972). 
The analysis offered by HeiDI for individual differences in Pavlovian conditioned responding rests on a single learning process – 
the development of reciprocal associations between the CS ad US – the behavioral sequelae of which are influenced by the relative 
perceived saliences of the CS (i.e., αCS) and the US (i.e., βUS; as given by VCS-US). However, others have explicitly argued that sign- 
tracking and goal-tracking, in particular, originate in two process of learning: with sign-tracking reflecting the fact that a lever CS 
gains incentive salience through its association with the US, while goal-tracking reflects the predictive value of the lever CS (see  
Berridge & Robinson, 2016; see also, Flagel, Akil, & Robinson, 2009; Lesaint, Sigaud, Flagel, Robinson, & Khamassi, 2014). Similarly, 
it has been suggested that while sign-tracking reflects a stimulus-response association (i.e., a lever-response association), goal- 
tracking reflects a stimulus-stimulus association (i.e., lever-outcome association; see Iliescu et al., 2018; Patitucci et al., 2016). These 
less parsimonious, dual-process accounts predict some of the results that are consistent with HeiDI, particularly the fact that sign- 
tracking is more resistant to extinction than is goal-tracking (e.g., Iliescu et al., 2018), and the related fact that a partial reinforcement 
schedule (or uncertainty) maintains higher levels of sign-tracking than does a continuous reinforcement schedule (see Robinson, 
Anselme, Fischer, & Berridge, 2014). However, these accounts are rather less consistent with other aspects of the behavioral results 
that we have summarized here, which provide support for HeiDI. For example, they provide no very clear basis for the observation 
Fig. 5. Simulations of RCS and RUS across training blocks (T1-T6) and trial epoch (1-4). The VCOMB outputs used in Eqs. 4 and 5 to calculate RCS 
(black symbols) and RUS (grey symbols) were generated using Eqs. 1–3. In panels A and B, at the start of a CS presentation αCS was either .3 (A) or .7 
(B) and βUS was fixed at .5; and in panels C and D, at the start of the CS presentation αCS was fixed at .5 and βUS was either .3 (C) or .7 (D). Across the 
4 epochs of a trial, the value of αCS was subject to exponential decay (αCS(1 – 0.10)2) and was reset at the start of each trial. The terminal values of 
αCS were used in Eqs. 1–3, while the (within-trial) decaying values were used in Eqs. 4 and 5. Adapted from: Iliescu, A.F., Dwyer, D.M., & Honey, 
R.C. (2020). Individual differences in the nature of conditioned behavior across a conditioned stimulus: Development and application of a model. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition (in press). 
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that the sign-tracking phenotype is most evident at the outset of a CS while the goal-tracking phenotype is most evident at the end of 
the stimulus (see Iliescu et al., 2020). Moreover, and as we have already noted, HeiDI provides an analysis of a very broad range of 
group-level phenomena that are simply beyond the scope of models developed in the context of one model system: Autoshaping in the 
rat.1 
If we accept the analysis provided by HeiDI for variation in the vigor and form of Pavlovian conditioned behavior, then a natural 
question is what are the origins of differences in the perceived salience of the CS (i.e., αCS) and US (i.e., βUS)? The simple answer to 
this question is that we do not know. But, one issue that might well constrain our capacity to address this question at behavioral, 
computation and neural levels is the fact that the sign-tracking and goal-tracking responses are (necessarily) quite different in a 
standard rat autoshaping procedure: A lever enables a set of responses that is simply very different from the set of responses directed 
towards the food well. This fact makes it easy to identify the two forms of responding, but it does not allow their ready comparison. 
To circumvent this issue, it would be advantageous to develop procedures where the sign-tracking and goal-tracking responses are 
measured (more) equivalently. For example, one could have adjacent food wells in which the (internal) illumination of one food well 
signals the impending arrival of food in the other food well. In this way, the measures of sign- and goal-tracking would be much more 
similar: Sign-tracking would be evident as entering the illuminated food well and goal-tracking by entering the well in which food 
was delivered. It remains to be seen whether this approach is a viable one: Will it yield individual differences in the form of 
conditioned responding that are evident in the conventional rat autoshaping procedure. 
To summarize: The development of HeiDI was inspired by the marked quantitative but especially qualitative individual differ-
ences in the form of conditioned responding observed in a Pavlovian conditioning procedure. These differences have not been dealt 
with by extant general process models of Pavlovian conditioning, for which associative strength (or some other unitary construct) is 
assumed to have a monotonic relationship to conditioned behavior (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972; see also, Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000; Stout & Miller, 2007). It should be noted that the rat autoshaping procedure in which the 
qualitative differences are observed is not one that is routine: While the appetitive US is standard, the lever CS is not. However, many 
of the behavioral phenomena that provide converging support for HeiDI from this procedure have clear counterparts in other con-
ditioning procedures (see Honey et al., 2020a, 2020b). Under these conditions, it seems entirely appropriate that HeiDI is formulated 
as a general process model, providing a relatively simple analysis for an extensive array of findings. 
Fig. 6. Mean (+SEM) z-transformed lever presses (black symbols) and food-well entries (grey symbols) during reinforced lever presentations in 
groups ST (upper panels) and GT (lower panels). The results from the 10-s lever presentations are broken down into 4 successive 2.5-s epochs for 
each of the 6 blocks of training (T1-T6). Adapted from: Iliescu, A.F., Dwyer, D.M., & Honey, R.C. (2020). Individual differences in the nature of 
conditioned behavior across a conditioned stimulus: Development and application of a model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning 
and Cognition (in press). 
1 It should be apparent, however, that there are other potential sources of variation within HeiDI that could also contribute to differences in the 
form of responding: The pre-existing differences in the connections between the CS, US and r1-r6; and the obvious potential for these connections to 
change (see Fig. 2; Honey, Dwyer, & Iliescu, 2020). 
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